@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Burge,Tyler}, subject = {Self- Identification}, note = {Frank I 696 Self-Identification/Burge: here you individuate your thoughts in such a way that you know them as tokens and as types of thoughts. We know which thoughts we think. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Twin Earth: Problem: But how can we individualize our own thoughts if we have not yet distinguished the right empirical conditions from the wrong empirical conditions? It is clear that we must presuppose the conditions for the thinking of a certain thought in the thinking of that thought! Some of them can only be recognized empirically. Example: to think of something as water, one must have a causal relationship to water. >Twin earth. Example: but to think that water is a liquid, we do not need that relationship! Here the (complex) conditions only have to be assumed. Frank I 697 Self-Identification/Burge: Knowledge of one's own thoughts is second level thinking. But the first thought is not merely an object; self-identification takes place in the same act. Therefore the conditions are the same for both. Again, one does not need to know the enabling conditions! It is enough to know that they are fulfilled. Both empirical and reflective thoughts presuppose conditions that determine their content. In both cases some of them can only be recognized empirically. Why does it not follow that one cannot know that one thinks that "this and that" is the case unless one undertakes an empirical investigation that shows that the conditions that "this and that" is the case are fulfilled? The answer is entangled, it has to do with the fact that you have to "start somewhere". Frank I 700 Self-Identification/perceptional knowledge/Burge: so far we have highlighted the similarities. But there are also differences: Self-Identification: here the demand for a distinction of twin-earth-thoughts is even more absurd than with perceptual thoughts. Frank I 702 Self-Identification/Burge: differs in these two aspects a) and b) from perceptual knowledge: if you are wrong about self-identification, it shows that there is something wrong with you (as opposed to wrong perception). Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663}, note = { Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=351933} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=351933} }