@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Chalmers,David}, subject = {Intensions}, note = {I 54 Intension/Chalmers: intension is a function that defines how a concept is used in different situations. It is not the same as "meaning" and also not a definition. >Meaning, >Definitions, >Situations, >Reference, >Use, cf. >Extension. I 57 Intension/Chalmers: depending on whether a concept picks out an object in the actual world, or in a counterfactual world, I will speak of primary and secondary intension. >Concepts, >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Terminology/Chalmers. Secondary Intension/Chalmers: secondary intension is therefore, independent of empirical factors. It describes how reference depends on how the outer world turns out. >twin earth, > rigidity). I 61 When counterfactual worlds are involved, it is not a priori determined what the reference is, since the actual world can be determined by different speakers as their own (mirror-inverted), >Centered Worlds/Quine. The determination as a primary or secondary intension will then also vary inversely. Cf. >Intensions/Stalnaker, >Propositions/Chalmers. I 62 Meaning/Chalmers: Both primary as well as secondary intensions are candidates for the "meaning" of a concept. "Water" could mean H2O, or twin earth water, depending on what is meant by the concept in the respective world. I 63 Necessary Truth/Chalmers: both can even be constructed as a necessary truth when possible worlds are conceived as uttering contexts. Cf. >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan, >Two-dimensional Semantics. I 200 Primary Intension/Chalmers: For example, the largest star in the universe: picks out a star in every given centered world. Even non-existent objects have a primary intension, e.g. the Nicholas, (Santa Claus). This primary intension could have picked out an object if the world had turned out accordingly. Cf. >Non-existence, >Possibilia. For my concept of consciousness, the primary intension is more important than a causal relation to an object. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 205 Also, a zombie can have primary intensions that are overlapping with mine. >Zombies. I 206 Quality/Qualia: primary intensions do not specify Qualia. >Qualia.}, note = { Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=360615} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=360615} }