@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Malcolm,Norman},
subject = {Identity},
note = {Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two.
>Pain, >Identification, >Individuation.
Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
>Sensations, >Sensory impressions, >Perception.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same.
>Description, >Concept, >Identity, >Equality, >Distinctions.
Cavell I 55
Identity/numeric/qualitative/Malcolm: in sensations, we must invent a criterion! E.g. Siamese twins with one hand: here you have to decide if there is one pain or two.
>Criteria, >Invention/Discovery, >Convention.},
note = { Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 },
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}