@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Millikan,Ruth},
subject = {Denotation},
note = {I 71
Denotation/stabilization function/reference/Millikan: more interesting is the stabilization function in referring or denotating expressions.
>Terminology/Millikan.
Question: is the classification as "denotating" or "referring" equal to the categorization as a function?
Millikan: Thesis: no, the characteristic for denotation is not a function, but intentionality.
>Intentionality.
Intentionality/Millikan: 1. Thesis: intentionality is not always intentional because of a particular function, but because of the way something normally performs its eigenfunction. The eigenfunction of intentional patterns themselves have practically nothing in common.
2. However, there is another commonality: intentional expressions lead to an identification of their speaker.
Representation: because of the identification function, such intentional states are representations.
>Representation.
Representation/Millikan: essential: representations need something to identify their referents. Through this they are representations.
No representation: e.g. bee dances do not identify a place ((s) they are not "about" something specific), but make other bees to behave appropriately.},
note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451019}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451019}
}