@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Millikan,Ruth},
subject = {Thoughts},
note = {I 13
Thoughts/Millikan: this is about knowledge-what.
>Propositional knowledge.
Classical realism: thinking and knowledge are separated for classical realism, and intentionality is transparent.
>Realism/Millikan.
I 13
Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware of their users.
E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances.
>Intentionality.
Thought: requires that the referent is identified.
Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are about. That is why they are representations.
I 244
Grasp/Millikan: what is it for a thinker to grasp what his thought is about?
I 245
Millikan: it is the ability to identify the referent of his thought with the referent of elements of other intentional icons.},
note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451158}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451158}
}