@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Millikan,Ruth}, subject = {Thoughts}, note = {I 13 Thoughts/Millikan: this is about knowledge-what. >Propositional knowledge. Classical realism: thinking and knowledge are separated for classical realism, and intentionality is transparent. >Realism/Millikan. I 13 Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware of their users. E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances. >Intentionality. Thought: requires that the referent is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are about. That is why they are representations. I 244 Grasp/Millikan: what is it for a thinker to grasp what his thought is about? I 245 Millikan: it is the ability to identify the referent of his thought with the referent of elements of other intentional icons.}, note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451158} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451158} }