@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Millikan,Ruth}, subject = {Nature}, note = {I 247 Thing/nature/being/classical realism/Millikan: because permanent objects could not step in front of the (only momentary conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing is transient and accidental). >Realism. Nature/classical realism: was sometimes interpreted in a simplistic way as a set of properties. Problem: how can the nature of a transient thing, its very identity, be a set of eternal properties? Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But that did not worry the philosophers back then. >Identity/Millikan, >Reality, >Properties/Millikan.}, note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451391} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451391} }