@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Millikan,Ruth},
subject = {Elm/Beech Example},
note = {I 153
Elm/Beech/Expert/Layman/Understanding/to mean/Millikan: the layman can think something of gold, elm trees or monotremes, even if he has no knowledge of these.
To mean: he can even mean the same as the expert!
N.B.: there are therefore no full-bodied intensions, which are common to all idiolects of the speakers of a public language.
Names/knowing/understanding/claiming/Millikan: Problem: is that not paradoxical? If I do not know anything about monotremes, except I've heard the name once, how can I mean the same with the word as the expert? E.g.
Expert: I'm going to Brazil, to explore monotremes.
I: What are monotremes?
Expert: what do you mean with "monotreme"?
Me: I mean what you mean, of course.
Expert: do you know what monotremes are?
Me: no idea, so I ask.
Expert: then you cannot have meant the same as I have.
Menon's paradox/Millikan: here we see a shadow of Menon's paradox.
Solution/Carnap: instead of "What are monotremes" we actually ask "What does the term 'monotreme' mean?" ((s) > semantic ascent).
Intuitive/Millikan: but this is the question about monotremes, not about words.
Understanding/Millikan: even a parrot can ask something about monotremes without understanding anything of them.
I 154
To mean/Parrot/Millikan: the parrot cannot mean the question of course.
To mean/Millikan: I can mean something with "monotreme", because I intend that the word has its eigenfunction, even if I cannot specify it in detail.
Expert/Layman/To mean/understanding/knowing/knowledge/Millikan: the paradox does not come from the fact that I cannot mean the same as the expert, but that there is a sense in which the expert knows what he means with "monotreme" and I do not know this in this sense ((s) not what I mean and not what the expert means).},
note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451628}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451628}
}