@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Proust,Joelle}, subject = {Experiments}, note = {I 237 Animal/experiment/method/HeyesVsCheney/Seyfarth/Proust: bad method: "set traps": a) females are visible for their offspring, b) not visible, warnings. Result: in different situations, the frequency of the cries does not change. Therefore, one might think that sea cats have no general notion for knowledge, since another has been acquired. HeyesVs: this negative result proves nothing at all. A positive one could have been interpreted either with reference to the presence of associative learning or to an intellectual attribution. In any case, the negative shows that the females do not seem to distinguish a situation in which the offspring ignore danger or reward from one in which they pay attention to this. >Learning, >Associative Learning. Triangulation/Animal/Experimen/Proust: Heyes: Triangulation allows to recognize evidence for the mind clearer. Here, after a learning phase, the roles of the coaches have been exchanged. Then the animals have no visual evidence. Nevertheless, they transfer the distinctions. >Triangulation. The researchers then concluded that the chimpanzees could "represent the visual perspective of another". Cf. >Theory of Mind. Vs: A later study made them radically revise their opinion: young chimpanzees do not distinguish between the coaches at all! E.g. a trainer with a bucket over his head, others with a bucket over their shoulder, a trainer with his back, one with his face to the animal. I 239 Conclusion: the previous learning was enough to explain why the chimpanzees were preferring to make certain communications. It does not seem to be the case that an intervening psychological variable of understanding of seeing as a source of knowledge plays a role in the behavior. >Behavior, >Seeing, >Animals. "Attentive observation" is for the chimpanzees only a movement association, not a process of the knowledge acquisition. >Cognition, >Knowledge, >Epistemology.}, note = { Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=482988} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=482988} }