@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Proust,Joelle}, subject = {Language}, note = {I 230 Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy. >Cartesianism. I 231 Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation. Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea. 1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not. 2. The term can then be applied to new cases. 3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory). >Predication, >True-of. I 232 Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations. These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc. Cf. >Theory of Mind.}, note = { Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=483431} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=483431} }