@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Bigelow,John}, subject = {Sufficiency}, note = {I 270 Conditions/Causation/Cause/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject. >Necessity, >Possibility, >Modalities, >Cause, >Effect. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly linked to a determinism of nature. >Conditions/Bigelow, >Determinism. Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is meant here only in the broader sense. VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean that we would have to give up the concept of causation to the extent that indeterminism exists. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the macroscopic world, however, we do not have to give it up at all. >Causality. Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions. Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability instead of sufficient conditions. >Probability.}, note = { Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=746619} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=746619} }