@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Boer,Steven E.}, subject = {Content}, note = {I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.}, note = { Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755020} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755020} }