@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Boer,Steven E.}, subject = {Propositional Attitudes}, note = {I XIV Propositional attitudes/individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain conditions of fulfillment. > Intensional Objects --- I XV Propositional attitudes/belief/Boer: the whole is plausible, but not substantial enough to answer philosophical questions. E.g. why are beliefs not complete under logical equivalence, and even if it is under entailment? What does it mean that two people have the same belief? (And not just a similar one). For example, how can rational people believe things that are not true? (Error, deception). For example, if water is necessarily H20, why does this not automatically provide the scientific knowledge? --- I XVI Solution: for such questions we need a substantial theory and ontology of beliefs qua propositional attitudes. That's what this book is all about. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.}, note = { Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755226} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755226} }