@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Papineau,David}, subject = {Purposes}, note = {I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. >Thinking, >Animal language. Papineau: nevertheless, pro module. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". >Rationality/Papineau. I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0 - 4 apply to simple living beings. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's". I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." I 259 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-means-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ... of our evolutionary heritage. Then the purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. I 276 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: must also use non-egocentric causal facts. (> Map, Map-Example). I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map-example. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would be no purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then plan on taking the path. This would be a combination of causal individual information.}, note = { Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=784713} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=784713} }