@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Blackburn,Simon}, subject = {Supervenience}, note = {Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), (Horgan 1993)(2): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: for logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the finding that the reference is preserved over possible worlds (is rigid). >Rigidity, >Intensions, >Primary Intension. The supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. >Conditional, >a priori. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). >Secondary Intension. Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/Chapter 2) >Contingency. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, therefore we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Supervenience/Chalmers 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. Terence Horgan (1993). On What There Isn’t. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):693-700.}, note = { Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=875741} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=875741} }