Lexicon of Arguments

 

Brandom I 375
Intention/Davidson/early: An intention refers to one thing or state - later Vs - Searle: for intentional action only "action intentions" - for pure intentionality: there is also "preceding intention".
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Avramides I 5
Language/Davidson/Avramides: The speaker must have the intention to use the words, so that the sentence is true if the state is as the sentence says.
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Glüer II 116
Intention/Davidson/Glüer: is an unconditioned judgment - contrary: pro-attitude: is a conditioned judgment: E.g. "If sweets are not harmful, then ...".
Glüer II 183
Intention/language/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: Davidson himself talks about the fact that the speaker can only mean what the interpreter is able to get out with his utterances. Since he speaks of mistakes, he can only start from a background of "correct" linguistic behaviour that is to be followed on the whole.
Glüer II 110
In the terminology of propositional attitudes, there can be no definition of the concept of intentional action. Possible deviating causal chains (e.g. unintentional trembling has an effect) cannot be missed.
Glüer II 112
Explanation/Criterion/Intention/Davidson/Glüer: Only the following criterion is possible:
(K2) Action x is intentional under description d only if the actor has a primary reason g for x under the description d, and g causes x in the right way.

Mere intentions are unrealized decisions to act. They require the assumption of an intermittent event between having the primary reason and the action.

>Actions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language, >Acts of will.