Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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I 169
Abstract/McGinn: why should not something that is essentially independent of consciousness (numbers) possibly have a profound nature that is inaccessible to our thinking?
Why should the abstract not be able to have a noumenal side?
Certainly, our attempts to define the category of the abstract are miserable, e.g. if we declare that it is not spatial or causal.
>Numbers, >Things in themselves.
I 170
It looks like the Abstract World pushes into the very nature of our mind in a way incomprehensible to us.
McGinn: We would do better to settle the corresponding objects within our mind. Then we would not have to deal with any "barriers" on top of everything. (Of course this does not solve the underlying problem).
>World/thinking/McGinn, >Reality/McGinn, >Ontology/McGinn, >Observation/McGinn.

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