Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 12
Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualism does not take possible worlds literally as worlds but as ways of how the world might have been.
N.B.: contingent identity is not allowed but probably contingent dissimilarity.
((s) According to Kripke, identity is always necessary identity insofar as descriptions are not involved, but names are).
>Identity/Kripke, >Rigidity, >Descriptions.
I 120
Actualism/Stalnaker: actualism is not a restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual".
>Materialism, >Nominalism.
I 128
Presentism/Stalnaker: presentism is analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis: we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds.
>Presentism.
Then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker pro).
Fusion/fission/personal identity: cases of fusion and fission are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two.
>Personal identity, >Fusion, >Split.