Lexicon of Arguments

 

IV 57
Meaning/Quine: meaning does not come from speaker meaning and not from the acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean. In this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori. So there are no analytic sentences. Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this.
>Criteria, >Speaker meaning, >Meaning, >Content, >Worldview.
IV 177ff
Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps we can assume a "gradual A"?.
Fodor/LeporeVs: we presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity. Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences are just about propositions of expression, because "John" refers just about to John. Not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous". Here, there is no inference from "cows are dangerous" and "brown things are dangerous". Therefore, there is no compositionality.
IV 186
Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, however none of the individual features is defining. E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow. Hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails. Important argument: even if you reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes! >Stereotypes.