Lexicon of Arguments

 

VI 393
Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data).
>Sense data, >Fact.
Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be.
>Verification.
N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent.
>Bivalence, >Incorrigibility.
Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that.
>Observation sentence, >Reference.
Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding.
>Metaphyiscal realism.
Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies.
>Meta language, >Private language.
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I (d) 124
Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again.
I (d) 125
It can even define reference à la Tarski.
>Truth definition/Tarski.
I (e) 150
Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions.
>Assertibility.