Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 185 ff
Concept/Rorty: Neither are there views that can be dissolved to terms (like Carnap), nor internal relations between concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in the Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytic philosophy".
I 192
RortyVsOxford: there are no grammatical discoveries alone between terms.
I 326f
RortyVsPutnam (internal realism): this means no more than that we should congratulate ourselves on the invention of the term lithium, so that something stands for lithium, for which all the time there had been nothing. The fact that based on our insights we are coping with the world very well is true, but trivial. That we adequately reflect it is "just an image". Cf. >Picture Theory.
I 339f
Platonic concepts: the trouble with them is not that they are "false", but that not much can be said about them. They cannot be naturalized or otherwise connected with our needs.
Davidson: would probably say the good would not require verificationist arguments.
>Platonism, >Ideas/Plato.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.