Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 76
Concept/experience/Sellars: it is not true that we have the concept of something because we recognize that sort of thing. It is rather the reverse: the ability to recognize a type of something, presupposes that one already has the concept of this type. We cannot have the impression of a tree, if we do not have the concept of the tree.
>Appearance, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Seeing, >Seeing-as.
---
II 308
Concept: A conceptual object will become what it is, only by the difference that was caused by its presence in at least some inferences. This is a familiar theme in contemporary philosophy. > Inferentialism/Brandom, inferential content/Brandom, inference/Brandom.
---
Field II 166
Term/Schiffer: a term is only the shadow of subsentential expressions.
>Subsententials.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.