Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 32
Concept/Logical Form/Wittgenstein: E.g. "thing", "complex", "number" are not concepts, but logical forms.
Concept/Wittgenstein: can be expressed as a propositional function - Number: is a pseudo concept - must occur within the brackets - e.g. (Example number). Fx. >Numbers.
False: (e.g.).x is a number - wrong: (e.g.).x is a thing - AF: f() = () is a human. But not: f () = () is a number!
II 34
Pseudo Concept: e.g. "color", "primary color": it draws a limit to language - Concept: e.g. red: draws a line in language. >Colours, >Language.
II 39
Point: (in maths) not a concept.
II 254
Concept/Meaning/Experience/Wittgenstein: the fact that a thing corresponds to a concept is not an empirical fact. - In a sense, it must always have corresponded to it. - ((s) but our concepts are like rules) - ((s) therefore correspondence is not a natural fact) >Correspondence, >Representation, >Experience.
On the other hand: correspondence with a pattern is an empirical fact.
II 255
Rules: do not follow from the concept, but are constitutive for it - the rules are also not included in the concept - a symbol connected to a concept is just another symbol. >Symbols.
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IV 46
Formal Concepts/Function/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4,126 formal concepts - (e.g. numbers, name) - cannot be represented by a function - each variable is the sign of a formal concept. >Signs.
IV 46f
Pseudo Concept/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: e.g. object - the variable name x is its real sign - correct use: "(e.g.) ..." - otherwise pseudo-sentences are formed - Pseudo-sentence: -there are objects- correct sentence: e.g. -there are books - Pseudo-sentence: to speak of the number of all objects.