Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 162 ff
Concept/Wright, Crispin: concepts appear intensionally in the response to judgments. Thus they do not make any requirements for the details of their extensions.
>Extension, >Intension, >Judgment.
I 201 ff
Perception/Theory/Wright:
1) Observing equals perceiving, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is conceptually characterized. (McDowell pro). This is now a good basis for the conception that the conceptual features of the subjects are different.
>Theory ladenness, cf. >Psychological Nominalism.
2) Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world goes beyond experience in infinitely many ways.
>Experience.
3) The comprehension of concepts does not merely consist in classifying. They include the possession of beliefs (e.g. that things form a species at all).
>Beliefs.
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II 229ff
Concept/Predicate/Wright: e.g. concept: color - predicate: red.
>Predicates, >Predication.

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