Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless (>
de re /
de dicto).
Putnam: (according to Rorty): Putnam follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers".
Wright/truth/justified assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVsEquating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
E.g. idealization: an idealization is not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
>
Idealisation, >
Meanging change, >
Realism, >
Internal realism, >
Observation, >
Obervation language, >
Truth.
---
Rorty VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong.
>
Pragmatism, >
Dewey.
PutnamVsRorty et al.: Rorty et al. ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality".
>
Intentionality.
Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
---
Putnam I (c) 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science (PutnamVsKuhn).
>
Truth/Peirce.
If you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically.
>
Incommensurability/Kuhn.
I (e) 141
Truth/assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from Tarski's his truth-definition also follows assertibility. The probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language.
>
Truth definition/Tarski, >
Object language, >
Meta language.
I (i) 246
Truth/justified assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement.
PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".
>
Kripke's Wittgenstein.
