Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle:
1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities.
>Operationalism.
2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ("built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations.
>Sensations, >Experience, >Appearance.
Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.)
>Two Dogmas/Quine, >Empiricism/Quine, >Analyticity/Quine.
Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states.
>Dispositions/Ryle, >Gilbert Ryle.
Just as wrong as the instrumentalistic approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...".
>Instrumentalism, Cf. >Constructivism, >Sense data.
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Rorty VI 182
Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference.
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Sellars I XXIXf
Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism.
Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate.
PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way.
Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior.
>Observation, >Observation language, >Mental Objects, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of Thought, >Mentalism.
I 91
Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts).
>Theoretical terms, >Unobservables.