Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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I 201 ff
Fashionable idea/realism/theory/science/WrightVs: every observation is theory-laden.
>Theory ladenness.
Perception/theory/Wright:
1. Observing equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is dominated conceptually. (McDowell pro).
>Sensory impressions, cf. >Psychological nominalism, >Nominalism.
This is now a good basis for the view that the conceptual features of the subjects is different.
2. Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world engages with infinitely many ways beyond experience.
>Experience.
3. The acquisition of concepts is not merely in classifying. They include the holding of beliefs. (For example, that things in general form a species).
Wright: that is certainly fine, but: beliefs should not be presupposed a priori for the terms. That is not appropriate. Terms are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience.
>Beliefs.
I 207
WrightVsTheoreticity of observation/theory ladenness: if all observation is theory-laden, there are no statements, which any subject is obliged to consent. - The legitimate assertibility is rather a four-digit relation between: statement - subject - experience development - background assumptions.
>Justified assertibility, >Background.

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