Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.
- - -
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today.
- - -
Dennett II 23ff
Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >
Thinking without language.
- - -
Rosenthal I 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
- - -
Metzinger I 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
Metzinger I 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >
Consciousness/Block.
- - -
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)
(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,
I 114
control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language.
ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)
(2) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a
(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)
(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)
(5), Shallice (1972
(6), 1988a
(7), 1988b
(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all.
Chalmers I 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b)
(9) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929).
Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.
1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978.
2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991
3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993.
4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995.
5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508
6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.
7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.
8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Dennett, D. The message is: there is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:919-31
