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I 103
Consciousness/Block: a >
zombie can have >consciousness. SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside.
I 112
Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural.
I 124f
Consciousness/McGinn: consciousness is a kind of substance. The substance itself is recognized by >
introspection but we cannot recognize the connection in principle.
SearleVsMcGinn:
1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain.
2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection.
I 149
Space/time/consciousness: asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle).
>
Time , >
Timeless , >
Space .
I 153f
Conditions of satisfaction/Searle: properties of the objects are >
fulfillment conditions of my experiences and they are therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective). Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression.
I 168 ff
Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism.
>
Incorrigibility , >
Introspection , >
Dualism , >
Cartesianism .
I 198 ff
Background: in the background there are skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds. Background: the background itself is not intention, "to be assumed" is not explicit propositional content and not explicit belief (objects are fixed). Network: additional knowledge cannot interpret itself, a network is intentional and no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").