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I 114
Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject?
Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone.
Cf. >
Apperception/Kant , >
Apprehension/Kant .
I 115
Strawson: face experiences depend on three things:
1) whether eyes opened,
2) where directed,
3) position of the body
E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something.
I 119
Possession of my body does not explain my concept of a self.
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Body , >
Self .
I 120f
Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive.
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Descartes , >
Person .
2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks".
(Strawson: ditto)
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Consciousness/Wittgenstein , >
Thinking/Wittgenstein .
I 127
Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition for attributing them also to others.
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Intersubjectivity , >
Recognition , >
Other minds >
Community .
Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed.
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Predicates/Strawson .
I 129
Other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness. - But this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for.
I 147
Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness.
I 171
Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular.
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Particulars/Strawson .