Lexicon of Arguments

 

V 65
Chance/Probability/Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.co./Possible Worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: It is legitimate to mention chances in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional - because probabilities are an objective property of the world - then you can say that there is a certain chance for C, even though this chance is unfulfilled - this is a counterexample to the alleged incompatibility - Conclusion: we should say that there would have been a tiny chance for convergence (that the possible worlds looked like the real world), even if Nixon had pressed the button.
>Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis.
V 91
Chance/Lewis:
a) in relation to time: E.g. in a labyrinth: it depends on the location how long we still need
b) timeless: E.g. radioactive decay.
"Endpoint chance": time not mentioned - chance depends on possible worlds (where one stands inside the labyrinth).
Chance: function of three arguments: Proposition, time, world.
V 98
Definition chance/Jeffrey: (R. Jeffrey 1965⁽¹⁾): is an objectified subjective probability.
V 99
Definition objectification: (in terms of a partition of a given world): the probability distribution obtained from a belief function by conditionalising (forming the conditional) through the element of the partition - objectified belief: the belief conditional on the truth - (only so much truth as is covered by the element) - which element is valid, is contingent and does not depend on what we think - an element: is the equivalence class of worlds in terms of equality of facts until before t and the dependency of the opportunities on the prehistory - ((s) I.e. in all possible worlds in which this prehistory is true ... will be.
V 130
Chance/Acceptable information/Lewis: problem: under the current analysis information about current opportunities is a disguised form of unacceptable information about future history.


1. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill