Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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III 393
Definability/fulfillment/truth/Kripke: in some cases truth can be defined, but not fulfilled, e.g. if the ontology of real numbers is not achievable in the meta language, but in the object language. If R(x) (truth of atomic sentences) is a simple basic concept, then truth the theory only exists with referential quantification about expressions of the object language and there is no fulfillment. ((s) because there are no objects.)
>Truth, >Truth definition, >Truth theories, >Satisfaction, >Satifiability.
III 393
Truth/fulfillment/definability: truth can be definable in a meta language (for a given referential object language), but it is not fulfilling, because the corresponding ontology is not achievable in the meta language. E.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different meta languages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. meta language assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate.
>Object language.
Satisfaction: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language is the one of the integers.

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