II 105
Purely disquotational true:
1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which)
2. "True-like-I-understand-it"
3. The concept is use-independent
E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate.
Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently.
Ad II 105
Definition disquotational/(s): "literal".
Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence.
>
Deflationism.
Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it".
Cf. >
Principle of charity, >
Understanding.
II 123
Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true.
>
Tarski-scheme, >
Truth definition/Tarski, >
Thruth theory/Tarski, >
Truth/Tarski.
ad II 135
Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words.
Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.#
>
Index words, >
Indexicality.
II 152
Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true.
>
Translation.
II 164
Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical.
Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world.
>
Possible worlds, >
Cross world identity, >
Actual world, >
Actualism, >
Actuality.
II 223
Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker.
Cf. >
Speaker meaning, >
Speaker intention.
II 259
Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless.
>
Reference.
II 261
Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level.
>
Indeterminacy.
II 269
Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect.
>
Logic, >
Semantics, >Idiolect.
Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization)
N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation.
II 272
Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation.
>
Stimuli, >
Stimulus meaning, >
Pointing, >
Ostension, >
Inference, >
Inferentialism.
