Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 117ff
Properties/possible worlds/Cresswell: E.g. in some possibe worlds there is a thing that has both: the property, the largest wooden and the property, to be the most beautiful building - in other possible worlds this thing has only one of the two properties.
Then you can see it (description: "The largest wooden building"
a) as a function, the value is in every possible world the thing that is the largest wooden building
b) as a function whose value is the most beautiful.
Contingent identity fails because from f(w) = g(w) does not follow f = g.
>Identity.
For necessary identity see: >Identity/Kripke.
II 166
Definition Properties/Proposition/Definition/Cresswell: if we accept propositions as basic concepts, we can define properties as the function of individuals on propositions.
>Propositions, >Basic concepts.
II II 167
RescherVs: (Rescher, 1975)⁽¹⁾: preferred to see properties as basic concepts - Field: (1978)⁽²⁾: banishes propositions, but allows properties.
>Properties.

1. Rescher, Nicholas 1975. Temporal Logic. In; J. Symbolic LogicVolume 40, Issue 2 (1975)
2. Field, H.H. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13, 9–61 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160888