Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 153
Fulfilment conditions/Searle: properties of objects are fulfilment conditons of my experiences, therefore they are difficult to distinguish from the properties of the experiences (but these are always perspective).
>Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Perspective/Searle.
- - -
II 105/6
Properties: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence, to look red is not independent from being red.
- - -
V 155
Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essentially predictive: one can just as well refer to them by singular nominal expressions.
>Predicate, >Attribution, >Singular term, >Predication.
V 153
Reference/implication/property/SearleVs: from the fact that my statement implies the existence of a property, it does not follow that I referred to a property with the statement.
>Implication.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.