Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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I 72
Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not.
>Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism.
Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that.
I 72/73
Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties.
1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red.
2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle.
3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world).
Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had.
>Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism.

1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96.
2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92.

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