McDowell I 73
Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content.
McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual.
Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >
Information system/Evans.
E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain.
Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience.
Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality).
Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world.
McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense.
Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory".
McDowell: that is precisely the >
spontaneity.
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McDowell I 80/81 ff
Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms!
For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.)
McDowell I 91
EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world.
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Frank I 524f
Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false.
I 526
Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object.
Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266
