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I 19
QuineVsSense Data Theory: immediate experience is not coherent, it is an autonomous area. >
Sense data/Quine .
Stroud I 216
Experience/Truth/Quine: the distinction itself is derived from scientific research.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience(!), but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience, insofar as their use is learned by direct conditioning to the stimulation of sensory receptors. Moreover, simple observation sets are in most cases actually independent of each other. >
Observation/Quine .
The fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my opinion, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the propositions of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex.
II 219
Cresswell imposes on me a realm of reified experiences or phenomena that stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that act on our nerve endings from real objects in the outside world.
VII (a) 17
Simplicity/Quine: is itself ambiguous and unclear. It is a double or multiple standard. Depending on the terminology.
Immediate experiences can be presented more easily in a physical conceptual scheme.
VII (b) 42
Knowledge/Quine: is a man-made network, experiences are only at the edges, in the core logic.
Conflicts with experience lead to changes in the centre. New truth values are assigned to some of our statements.
The entire field is under-determined by its boundary conditions, therefore there is a large selection of possibilities, which statements are to be revised.
VII(b) 43
No specific experience is associated with specific statements within the field, except by indirect considerations on the balance of the field as a whole.