Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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McDowell I 163
Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system.
>Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars.
Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena.
Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs).
>Beliefs/Sellars.
---
I XXXVIII
Sellars: Three possible experiences:
1. This is a red object,
2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light).
3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible).
>Appearance/Sellars.
One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett).
Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object.
I 44
Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance.
But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing.
Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience.
Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names?
I 44
Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience.
I 45
Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs.

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