Glüer II 99 ff
Explaining means re-describing.
Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events.
Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself. >
Causes, >
Reasons, >
Reason/Cause, >
Motives, >
Description/Davidson.
Glüer II 112f
Explanation of Action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (mountaineer-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. >
Weakness of will.
Glüer II 114
Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable."
Weak will/Acrasia/Davidson: irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention.
Glüer II 115
"All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings.
Glüer II 138
Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible.
There are no strict laws for the prediction of actions. - >
Anomalous monism.
- - -
Horwich I 456
Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true). - also the existence of truth needs no explanation.
Wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong".
Correct: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---".
Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something.
Explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances.
"Truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual scheme"). It is an idle wheel. - Putnam ditto.
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994