Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty VI 144
Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink.
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I 137
Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator.
Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible.
I 335
We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility.
Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question".
Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that.
I 416
Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven.
Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence.
I 424
Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence.
I 102
Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon).