I 24
Sellars: thesis: seeming prima facie = to be.
I 26
Seeming/Appearance/Tradition: Being is more basal than seeming.
Seeming is not a relationship between a person, a thing and a property.
Tradition: Sense data should explain seeming.>
>
Sense data theory.
Sellars: this is unnecessary.
Experience/Sellars thesis: "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed.
cf. Ryle: >
Success word).
Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green.
Seeming/Sellars: is not a relationship at all.
>
Appearance, >
Perception, >
Belief, >
Language use, >
Predicate, >
Property, >
Seeing, >
Experience, >
Stimuli, >
Relation.
I 30 ff
Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances.
>
Sensory impressions.
Phenomena are conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs).
>
Phenomena.
Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences.
I 32
Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green.
>
Concept/Sellars.
I 36
Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming. - We must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance.
>
Dispositions.
---
I 38
Seeming/appearing/being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have.
Solution:
a) on the basis of empirical generalization
b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience".
- - -
Brandom I 425
Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like":
Generic "seems"-statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999.
---
Rorty VI 147/48
Appearing/seeming/explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks.
>
Thomas Nagel, >
Speaker meaning, >
Speaker intention, >
Language use, >
Word meaning.