Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 209
Logic/Independence/Field: what does not go with a set of concepts (e.g. a distinction, a proof) does also not go with an extension of the concepts when the new concepts are merely derived from the old ones only.
>Conservativity, >Concepts, >Conclusion, >Consequence, >Theories.
I 257
Possibility/Field: modified concept of possibility: "is a possible extension of the actual world" (the real one). - Then there are models in which singular terms denote nothing.
>Possible worlds, >Singular terms, >Denotation, >Reference, >Actual world, >Cross world identity, cf. >Centered worlds.
The extension then provides a term for something that would not have a denotation in the non-extended model. - Then we will need an additional predicate "act" for the distinction.
Problem: this only works outside the modal contexts.
>Modalities, >Modal logic.
Solution: truth must define truth in a model relative to another model, which is a sub-model of the first.
>Models.
---
II 356
Expansion/Theory/Language/Predicate/Field: one cannot simply decide to introduce a new predicate for which the indeterminacy of all extensions does not apply.
>Introduction.
---
III 95f
2nd order logic/Field: E.g. quantifiers like "there are infinitely many". - ((s) Quantified over sets). - Also not: e.g. "there are fewer Fs than Gs".) - ((s) Fs and Gs only definable as sets or properties.).
>Quantifiers, >Second order logic.
III 98
Expansion of Logic: Preserves us from a vast area of additionally assumed entities. - E.g. "What obeys gravitation theory".
>Theoretical entities, >Ontology.
QuineVs: rather accept abstract entities than expand the logic. - (Quine in this case per Platonism).
>Logic/Quine.