Schwarz I 30
Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there.
>
"there are"/existence.
- - -
Lewis IV 24
Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is".
>
Actuality/Lewis.
IV 40
Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics).
Cf. >
Modal realism, >
Metaphysical possibility/Lewis.
This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers).
- - -
Schwarz I 20
Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator.
Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables.
Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited.
Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view.
Cf. >
Four dimensionalism.
Schwarz I 30
Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b
(1). Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence.
LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991
(2),80f,1986e
(3),212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree".
Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist.
Schwarz I 42
Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence:
Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them.
>
counterparts, >
counterpart relation, >
counterpart theory.
Schwarz I 232
Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b
(4),291).
Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations.
>
Truth maker/Lewis.
1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press
2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell
3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431.