Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Concepts
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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 82 f
Colors/McDowell: If the recognition of shades of color is conceptual, then we probably do not have the concepts before the color experience, but if we have the concept of a shade of color, then our conceptual potential is sufficient to capture our color experience in all its detail.
>Recognition.
I 83
Why should recognition not be conceptual?
Fine graininess: here, the demonstrative expressions certainly play a special role. But why should they be less rationally integrated into spontaneity? (>pointing, >ostension).
I 202
Ability to distinguish: in connection with shades of color it is a permanent ability of the subject. The experience gives this potential relevance.
>Distinction.
Color/Wittgenstein: there are no "stored classifications". No psychological machinery.
>Color/Wittgenstein.
I 203
Color/McDowell: our ability to apply the concept of shade is not based on a comparison with a stored pattern.

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