Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 146
Functionalism/Avramidis: functionalism allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior. - It allows a subjective image of the mind.
>Propositional attitudes, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Language behavior.
I 147
Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes.
I 149
Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology.
>Theoretical terms, >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Observation.
These shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest. - Then we transform every theoretical term into a name, replace the names with free variables. - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence).
>Ramsey sentence, >Open formula.
With that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation. - Then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology.
>Input/output.
Problem/Avramides: how do we characterize input and output?
BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally. ((s) Because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones.)
>Philosophical chauvinism.
I 153f
AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization.
Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior. - Even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation.
So if normal evidence (Ned Block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological.
>Language behavior, >Ned Block.