Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I (b) 16 ff
Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible
Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects.
We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense.
No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.
- - -
Frank I 678
Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived.
Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person.


Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.