II 294
Action/causation/cause/Nozick: if an action is caused, then by a consideration.
>
Reason/cause, >
Reasons, >
Motivation, >
Motives, >
Causes, >
Causation.
The other way round: which considerations we provide with a causal status depends on how we acted.
Cf. >
Cognitive Dissonance.
II 294
Free will/Nozick: difference:
a) action caused (by reasons, consideration), could have been different
b) causally determined (by intractable things) could not be more different.
Cf. >
Determinism, >
Freedom of will, >
Will, cf. >
Anomalous monism.
II 294
Decision/ethics/Nozick: is not a discovery of weighting, but attribution of relevance.
>
Relevance.
Then the decision is not causally determined by the weights - but not every reason is always available to everyone - E.g. history of art: not every style was always available.
>
Art, >
Style, >
Artworks, >
History, >
Historiography.
II 299
Action/self-subsumtion/Nozick: a decision may be self-subsuming: they can establish principles that govern not only the act but also the weighting itself.
>
Principles.
This is not a repetition of the weighting - e.g. strategy: that the result is always the best - the decision to follow this strategy itself is an action that falls under the weighting that it attributes.
>
Self-reference, >
Description levels, >
Levels/order.
II 300
The act of decision can also refer to itself.
II 300
Decision/fulfillment model/Herbert Simons: (instead of optimization model): you choose an action that is good enough - if you don’t find one, you continue to look and reduce your expectations - the opnion of what is good enough changes.
Optimization model: here the costs are also taken into account.
>
Bounded Optimality/Simons, >
self-reference.
a) looking among known alternatives
b) devising new alternatives.
II 304
Reflexive: a free decision is reflexive: it exists by virtue of the weights that are conferred on it by their own validity.
>
Validity, cf. >
Validity claims.
II 318f
Action/decision/free will/knowledge/belief/Nozick: actions and decisions may be seen like beliefs and facts (covariance, connection to facts).
>
Covariance, >
Facts.
>ccordingly, methods can be weighed as well.
II 321
Connection: consists in judgmental belief.
>
Values, >
Beliefs.