Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty I 289
DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: VsHolism: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (fact/interpretation and necessity/contingency).
>Facts, >Interpretation, >Necessity, >Contingency.
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III (b) 84/85
HolismVs distinction sense/reference, extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: meaning changes constantly - theory: believing-to-be-true - new sentences change language behavior (approval and rejection of other sentences) - later no identification of the new sentences anymore. - Extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: no concept of meaning, the concept of change in meaning useless - DummettVsHolism: our presentation would depend on where we happen to begin - still: determine dispositions only after believing-to-be-true - (first truth, then meaning.) - In every theory, new judgements change the dispositions, therefore dispositions are not determinant for the meaning! - It is wrong to think a sentence has no inherent meaning. - Theory: it is about new judgments, not new meanings.
III (b) 85
Extreme Holism says, from the quantity of sentences believed to be true (without knowledge about the causal circumstances) future dispositions could be derived.- Vs: that is impossible.
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III (c) 125ff
Holism/Deception/Dummett: has no criterion for specific speaker meaning in a particular case - only the tendency of believing-to-be-true - hence we have no concept of error.
III (c) 130
Holism believes meaning theory to be impossible. - Dummett: maybe he is right.
III (c) 150
Holism/DummettVsHolism: Problem: the set of all true sentences must then not contain any index-linked characteristics - HolismVs: solution: could propose instead a set of index-linked judgments. - DummettVsVs: then no speaker knows the meaning theory. >Meaning theory.