Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell).
Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
I 211
Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa.
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute.
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer.
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable.
>Objects/Quine.
I 397
Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle.
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate.
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme:
(1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a)
in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa.
From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with:
(2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a.
Geach I 240
But Geach is for relative identity.
Quine V 86
Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog".
Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap.
V 89
Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing.
V 161
Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning:
1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity).
2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms.
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses.
V 162
Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses.
VII (d) 65ff
Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages.
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes.
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'.
X 99
Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters.
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

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