Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 255
Material conditional/paradoxes of the material implication/Jackson/Field: best solution: (Jackson, 1979)⁽¹⁾: Thesis: Contraintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: the conclusions cannot be asserted, but nevertheless true.
>Acceptability, >Truth, >Conclusions.
There is a conventional implication for that if we assert "if A then B", not only the probability is high (A > B), but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A).
>Probability, >Probability conditionals.
N.B.: the demand that P (A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P (B I A) is high.
>Nonfactualism.
"Surface logic": has to do with assertibility - "depth logic": says what is truth-maintaining.
>Assertibility, >Truth transfer.
II 256
Factualism: has then to distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level.
>Facts/Field.
Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can distinguish between nonfactualism and factualism without using the terms "true" or "fact".
>Deflationism.
Factualism: the factualism does not accept any contraintive conclusions.
Nonfactualism: seems committed to it.

1.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review
Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589